Document Type : Original Article
Authors
Department of Health Services Management, Health Management and Economics Research Center, Isfahan University of Medical Sciences, Isfahan, Iran
Abstract
Context: One of the most important subjects in health economics and healthcare management
is the theory of induced demand. There are different views about the concept of induced
demand. Extensive texts have been presented on induced demand, however a compatible
concept has not necessarily been provided for this phenomenon and it has not been defined
explicitly. Aims: The main aim of this article is to understand the concept of induced demand
with the use of experts’ perceptions of Isfahan University of Medical Sciences. Settings and
Design: The research was done using a qualitative method. Semi-structured interview was
used for data generation. Participants in this study were people who had been informed in this
regard and had to be experienced and were known as experts. Purposive sampling was done
for data saturation. Materials and Methods: Seventeen people were interviewed and criteria
such as “reliability of information” and “stability” of the data were considered. The anonymity
of the interviewees was preserved. Statistical Analysis Used: The data are transcribed,
categorized and then the thematic analysis was used. Results: In this study, 21 sub-categories
and three main categories were derived. Three main subjects were included: Induced demand
definition, induced demand elements, and induced demand methods. Each of these issues
contained some sub-subjects. Conclusion: The result of this study provides a framework for
examining the concept of induced demand. The most notable findings include the definition
of induced demand, induced demand elements, and method of induced demand. In induced
demand definition, an important issue that is often overlooked is that inducing regarding to
the effectiveness of clinical services and medical values can lead to better or worse outcomes
for patients. These findings help the health policy makers study the phenomenon of induced
demand with clear-sighted approach.
Keywords
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